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Abstract. We propose a broadcast method to establish symmetric keys
between wireless sensor nodes and a sink, that achieves a different key
for each node. We apply the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key
exchange mechanism in two parts. The first part of the ECDH key ex-
change is conducted in a secure environment before network deployment
to avoid the common man-in-the-middle problem of Diffie-Hellman (DH)
schemes. The second part of the key exchange is initiated periodically by
the sink using a broadcast message. Thus, the communication overheads
in the resource constrained sensor network are reduced.
1 Introduction and Motivation
In many sensor networks, data readings are forwarded hop-by-hop towards a
sink. Thereafter, the data is analysed at the central sink node. Such a sensor
network scenario is considered within this paper.
Many wireless sensor network applications (for example physical intrusion
detection systems) require end-to-end security between sensor nodes and the
sink. The sink must be sure that the received data was originated by the sensor
node and that it was not modified in transit. Thus, each sensor node and the
sink must share cryptographic keys.
The used cryptographic keys need to be refreshed periodically to prevent
cryptanalysis. Traditional key negotiation methods are not useful for the ap-
plication domain of wireless sensor networks as they do not take their specific
constraints on energy and communication bandwidth into account.
We propose a new way of using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) to
provide efficient and secure key exchange in wireless sensor networks. The first
part of the ECDH key exchange is conducted before network deployment. The
second part of the key exchange is initiated periodically by the sink using a
broadcast message. As the first part of the exchange is executed in a secure
environment, the man in the middle problem common to Diffie-Hellman scenarios
is avoided. The use of a broadcast message to complete the second half of the
key exchange allows us to minimise the communication overhead required to
perform a key exchange.
2 Proposed Key Exchange Mechanism
Diffie-Hellman[1] is a well established method to agree a key k between two par-
ties, A and B, without transmitting the key k over the insecure communication
channel itself. For the proposed protocol we decided to use the Elliptic Curve
(EC) variation of DH. EC cryptography provides the same security as classical
cryptographic methods while using significantly shorter keys. Thus, the key ma-
terial that has to be exchanged within DH is reduced, which is of importance in
a resource constrained wireless sensor network.
Within elliptic curve DH (ECDH[2]), a key between A and B is established
as follows. A and B agree a curve base G. A generates secret number a and
calculates the corresponding public point P = (xa, ya) = Ga. B generates secret
number b and calculates the public point Q = (xb, yb) = Gb. Then, P and Q
are exchanged over the insecure channel. A and B can now calculate the shared
key as k = aQ = aGb = bP . A possible attacker has only access to P and
Q (and possibly G) which is not sufficient information to feasibly calculate k.
However, an attacker might be able to intercept and modify all messages and,
thus, negotiate a key ka with A and kb with B. The standard DH is prone to
such man-in-the middle attacks.
The basic idea of the proposed ECDH based key exchange protocol is to use
the previously described ECDH in the following way:
Phase 1 (Before Deployment)
1. All nodes are configured with the same EC parameters (including G).
2. an is generated for all n nodes and the Pn = (xn, yn) = Gan are calculated.
3. an is stored on each corresponding node and all Pn are stored on the sink.
Phase 2 (After Deployment)
1. Regularly, the sink creates a new secret number b and public point Q = Gb.
2. The public point Q is then broadcast to all nodes.
3. Each node and the sink generate new keys kn = anQ = bPn.
3 Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed protocol has the benefit that unique keys can be set for all nodes
in the network by sending just a single broadcast message. The key material can
be included in broadcast messages that might be distributed by the sink to set
other network parameters (e.g. routing messages for topology forming). We are
currently implementing and evaluating the described protocol for TinyOS 2.x on
TelosB motes.
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